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TAXATION REFORM IN CHINA'S PUBLIC FINANCE
By Penelope B. Prime
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SUMMARY
Tax reform is an important component of China's overall -co-
nomic reform because taxation raises government revenue and in-
fluences enterprise decisions, without subjugating enterprises tu
direct government control. This paper presents an overview of
China's tax reform since 1983. The main feature of this tax reform
was that state enterprises began paying industrial and commercial
taxes instead of remitting profits, referred to as 1i gai shui (chang-
ing profit to tax). In principle, this tax reform contained many de-
sirable characteristics, but problems with other aspects of economic
• China Branch, Center for International Research, Bureau of Census, Department of Com-
merce; Department of Economics, Georgia State University.
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reform have diluted the positive incentive effects implicit within
the new tax system.
I. INTRODUCTrION
Taxation is a key determinant of economic behavior and resource
allocation. The more decentralized an economy is, the more impor-
tant the tax structure becomes in enhancing, or hindering, the ef-
fectiveness of the public sector. As part of its ambitious economic
reform program beginning in 1978, China has paid increasing at-
tention to how taxation affects decentralized decision-making. Al-
though experiments with new taxes have been ongoing, comprehen-
sive changes in the tax system began in 1983. Tax reform is impor-
tant in China because of its potential effect on government revenue
and on the central government's ability to guide enterprises, and
local governments, without stifling initiative.
During the period of economic reform, and especially in the
second half of the 1980s, China has also experienced persistent
budgetary deficits. While these deficits have not been large by
international standards, the fiscally conservative Chinese leader-
ship considers deficits a major problem. The deficit problem has
caused Chinese policy-makers to be concerned with increasing tax
revenue to cover budgetary expenditure.
This paper presents an overview of China's tax reform and
recent trends in government revenue collection. The first section
discusses the new role China envisions for tax policy. Trends in the
state budget, and in growth and sources of government revenue,
are presented in the second and third sections. The final two sec-
tions look at enterprise reforms and performance, and the potential
effect of these on government revenue.
While tax policy would be expected to affect government reve-
nue, a causal relation is difficult to establish in this case because of
the many other reforms China has implemented along with tax
reform. The purpose here is simply to look at what has been hap-
pening on the revenue side of the budget in light of China's new
tax policies. The theme that emerges is that while China's tax
reform is well intended, the ability of the government to establish
a sound but flexible, tax-based public finance system is both essen-
tial to, and dependent on, the success of the other- ecoomic Ie-
forms.
II. A NEW ROLE FOR TAX POLICY
The National Tax Bureau of the Ministry of Finance summarized
the purpose of China's tax reform in the following six general
goals: I
1. Increase the number of tax categories and tax rates.
2. Vary tax rates by product and sector in order to influence the
direction of economic development, and to encourage exports
while protecting domestic production.
Guojia shuiwu ju [National Tax Bureau], Shuifa daquan (SFDQ) [Complete Guide to Tax
Law] (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1989), p.9 .
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These two goals contrast with policy in the late 1960s and early
1970s when China's goal was to simplify the tax system as much as
possible. Within industry and commerce, for example, the number
of taxable items fell from 108 to 44. The number of tax rates also
fell, with reportedly only 16 in use. Most enterprises paid only one
tax.2 Simplification was consistent with direct government control
over enterprises through the planning process, but to encourage en-
terprise initiative while maintaining some influence over the direc-
tion of the economy requires sophistication in tax instruments and
adjustable tax rates.
3. Improve management and increase the economic responsibility
of state enterprises by changing to a profits tax with retention
of after-tax profits, rather than having enterprises remit all of
their profits directly to the state budget.
Before economic reforms began in 1978, enterprise remittance of
profits made up a larger share of government revenue than did
taxes. The goal of replacing enterprise profit remittance with in-
dustrial and commercial taxes establishes taxation as an indirect
"lever" to influence managers' decisions. This reform separates
state enterprises from the government budget. Previously state en-
terprise accounts were part of China's public finance budget, and
were made compatible with plan targets. Enterprises contributed
nearly all of their profits to government revenue, but profits them-
selves were only an accounting phenomenon. Likewise, wage pay-
ments and reinvestment decisions had little to do with whether the
enterprise was profitable or not, and managers had little control
over incentives or production.
Taxation of state enterprise profits would reduce the difference
between state and collective enterprises. Unlike state enterprises,
collectives have always paid profit taxes and have been responsible
for losses if they occurred. The budget has subsidized collectives to
some extent, but the operation of collectives has not been part of
the budget's function. Therefore one significance of separating
state enterprises from the budget would be to put state enterprises
in competition with collectives for inputs and customers. Further-
more, profits would become the most important objective for state
enterprises, since funds for bonuses and reinvestment would no
longer be provided through the budget.
This goal has been implemented via the ii gai shiP tax reform,
which is discussed later in this section.
4. Use taxes to adjust enterprise profits that are excessively high
or low due solely to the artificial nature of the planned price
system.
The purpose of this goal is to reward enterprises by allowing
them to keep after-tax profits that are earned as a result of better
management rather than as a result of the price system. This goal
is necessary because China has gone forward with tax reform
before price reform.
This goal has also been implemented as part of the 1i gai shui
reform in the form of an "adjustment tax' on enterprise profits.
2 SFDQ, p.7.
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5. Guarantee that the government will have sufficient revenue
while creating incentives for enterprises, localities, and govern-
ment bureaus to increase their profits by devising ways to
share increments in profits.
This goal addresses China's desire to develop a tax policy that
will give incentives to enterprises to increase their profits, and to
governments to improve their tax collection and supervision func-
tions. It is an extension of goals 3 and 4 in that it addresses incre-
ments in profits earned or revenue collected, and would allow
higher retention rates for these increments.
To encourage enterprises to increase profits, this goal has been
implemented as part of measures designed to make enterprises
mo'e "responsible" for their performance. This is discussed in sec-
tion V of this essay in connection with the enterprise contract
system. To encourage local governments to increase revenue collec-
tion, the Ministry of Finance has tried various forms of central-
local government revenue-sharing. This is discussed in section IV.
6. Divide each tax into central and local (and shared) portions to
ensure both levels have taxation authority and sources of reve-
nue.
In the past, local governments have not had the authority to tax
for local needs. They have relied on resources that were approved
by, and usually hared with, central authorities. At the same time,
the majority of government revenue is collected by local govern-
ments for the central government. The purpose of this goal, in com-
bination with goal 5, is to establish a less arbitrary division of reve-
nue sources and expenditure responsibility. The division of each
tax into local, central, or shared proportions was established in
1985.
In implementing these six general goals, the core program has
been the introduction of a new set of industrial and commercial
taxes that replaced profit remittance in state enterprises, called 1i
gai shui. Li gai shui was implemented in two phases. In the first
phase, begun in June 1983, enterprises paid a profit tax and remit-
ted a portion of after-tax profits.:- Various calculation methods of'
tax and profit payments were used, but total payments fOr 1988 3
were set to be approximately the same as in 1982. In th second
phase of 1i gai shui all profit remittance was replaced with tax-
ation. This phase began in October 1984, and comprised the follow-
ing five parts: c_
1. Divide the industrial-commercial tax into four taxes (product,
value-added, turnover, and resource); make the product tax
more detailed with adjustable rates.
2. Collect a natural resource tax from mining enterprises. (This
tax is in addition to the salt tax, which has existed since 1950).
2. Reintroduce taxes on housing, land utilization, vehicle utiliza-
tion, and urban maintenance and construction.
3 For details of this phase see Katharine Huang Hsiao, The Government Budget and Fiscal
Policv in Mainland China (Taipei: Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, 1987). pp 162-
64.
1 5 I WI I
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4. Levy a 55 percent profits tax on large and medium sized state
enterprises, and one of eight rates on small state enterprises.
5. Levy an additional adjustment tax on profits (an excess profits
tax), using 1983 profits as a base.
Most of these five parts have been implemented. The existing in-
dustrial and commercial tax categories as of 1989, and their start-
ing dates are summarized in Figure 1. These changes have substan-
tially increased the complexity and sophistication of China's tax
system. If these changes work as intended, this increased sophisti-
cation can serve to make China's tax system more flexible and
transparent, and therefore a potentially powerful "economic lever"
for influencing the direction and performance of the economy.
III. THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET
Several recent trends in China's public finance, however, suggest
that the transition from a centrally directed public finance system
to one that is tax-based will not be easy. Budget deficits have been
one problem that has been particularly sensitive for Chinese lead-
ers. Table 1 reproduces annual official figures since 1978 for
China's total (central and local) budgetary revenue and expendi-
tures and the size of the surplus or deficit. These figures show that
China's budget deficit problem was consistently worse during the
seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) compared with the previous
Five-Year Plan period (1981-1985). The seventh Five-Year Plan
period began with a deficit of 7.06 billion yuan in 1986. In 1989 the
deficit reached 9.54 billion yuan, with a planned deficit in 1990 of
8.90 billion yuan. The average deficit for the five-year period was
8.11 billion yuan compared with an average of 2.42 billion in the
previous five-year period. 4
Furthermore, these official figures include revenue raised from
issuing government bonds as budgetary revenue. The practice of'
counting bonds as revenue is common in socialist planned econo-
mies because of the ideological and political importance placed on a
balanced budget in a socialist system. This goal has resulted in a'c-
counting practices that differ from Western methods, ofteni with
the purpose of decreasing or hiding deficits.)' In Table 2 the official
figures are adjusted to exclude foreign and domestic bonds -is reve-
nue. With these adjusted figures the deficit situation looks s.tibstaln-
tiaily worse, reflecting the fact that reliance on raising revenue by
issuing bonds has grown in recent years. The adjusted deficit in
1986 was 20.88 billion yuan. The deficit steadily increased through-
out the period to reach 36.97 billion in 1989, with a planned deficit
of 42.34 billion in 1990.
4 Part of the deficit increase is explained by a change in accounting practices Befre POO;
both price and enterprise subsidies were recorded as negative revenue. Beginning in 19'i price
subsidies have been recorded as an expenditure item. It is unlikely, however, that the three-fid
increase in the deficit between the two five-year periods can be explained in this way. See ('aiI-
heng bu zonghe jihua si [General Planning Department, Ministry of Finance], Zhongguo (-a,.-
heng tongii 1950-1988 (ZGCZTJh [China's Finance Statistics 1950-19881 (Beijing: Zhongguo caiz-
heng jingji chubanshe, 1989), pp. 17, 197, and Guojia tongji ju [State Statistical Bureau],
(ZGTJNJ. 1989).
5 See P. T. Wanless, Taxation in Centrally Planned Economies (New York: St. Martin's Press,
19851, pp. 66-7.
Figure 1. Industrial and Commercial Taxes: 1989
Circulation Taxes
1. Product (1964)
2. Value -dded (1983)
3. Turnover (1984)
Prof it and Income Taxes
4. State enterprise profit (1964)
5. State enterprise adjustment (1984)
6. Collective enterprise profit (1966)
7. Urban-rurat individual irdustrial
industriat-commercial profit (1966)
8. individual incom_(1960)
9. Individual adjustment (1967)
10. Chinese-foreign joint-venture
profit (1980)
11. Foreign enterprise profit (1982)
12. Private enterprise profit (proposed)
Resource Taxes
13. salt (1950)
14. Natural resource (1964)
Seial Purpoe Taxes
15. Construction (1983)
16. Oil consumption (1962)
17. $onus (1964)
18. Wage adjustment (1965)
Property & Behavior Taxes
19. Housing experimental)
20. Vehicle use (1986)
21. Urban maintenance
and construction (1964)
22. Slaughter (1950)
23. Animat transaction tax (1953)
24. Market transfer (1962)
25. Land use (experimentat)
Sources: GuoJia shuiwu ju (National Tax Bureau], Shuifa daqusn (SFO0) (Complete Guide to Tax Low] (Beijing: Zhongguo caizhn jingji bu chubmnsho,
1969), pp. 8-13; Caizheng bu zenghe jihu& si (General Planning Department, Ministry of Finance], Zhongtuo ceizheN tongjI, 1950-198 (ZGCZTJ) (China's
Finance Statistics, 1950-1968] (Beijing: Zhongguo coizheng jingji chubunhe, 19J91, pp. 40-43.
Notes: 1. Dates in parentheses give approximate beginning of implementation.
2. Sam of the taxes have been reintroduced. For example, the 1966 vehicle use tax is a new form of the vehicle license tax begun in 1950.
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Table 1. Total National Budgetary Revenue, Expenditure,
and Balance: 1978-1988 (billion yuan)
Surplus or
Year Revenue Expenditure deficit
1978 112.11 111.10 1.01
1979 110.33 127.39 -17.06
1980 108.52 121.27 -12.75
1981 108.96 111.50 -2.55
1982 112.40 115.33 -2.93
1983 124.90 129.25 -4.35
1984 150.19 154.64 -4.45
1985 186.64 184.48 2.16
1986 226.03 233.08 -7.06
1987 236.89 1 244.85 -7.95
1988 262.80 270.66 -7.86
1989 291.92 301.46 -9.54
1990 323.65 332.55 -8.90
Note: The figures for 1986 and later are not
compatible with figures of revenue and expenditure from
previous years. I- 1986, due to the fact that some items
previously deducted from revenue were reclassified as
expenditure, there were nominal increase in both revenue
and expenditure. Figures for 1990 are planned.
Sources: Guojia tongji u State Statistical
Bureau], Zhoagquo tongii nianjian, 1989 ZGTJNJ 1989)
[China's Statistical Yearbook, 1989] (Beijing: Zhongguo
tongJil chubanshe, 1989), p. 657, for 1978-1987;
ZGCZTJ, p. 12, for 1988; and Foreian Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS) 12 April 1990, pp. 16-17, for
1989 and 1990.
IV. TRENDS IN REVENUE COLLECTION
The fact that budget deficits have worsened during the period in
which tax reform was implemented raises the question of how g4-
ernment revenue has fared.
UNSTABLE GROWTH IN REVENUE
One salient characteristic, and problem, for China's public fi-
nance has been the variability of budgetary revenue. This is shown
in Table 3, where bond revenue has been excluded. Revenue actual-
ly fell 4.9 percent in 1979, 2.4 percent in 1980, and 2.5 percent in
1981. Revenue increased annually after 1981, but at rates varying
from a low of 2.3 percent in 1982 to a high of 22.1 percent in 1985.
Part of this instability was due to inflation, since revenue and
expenditure data are reported in current prices. For-comparison,
Table 3 also gives China's officially reported, annual increases in
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Table 2. Total National Budgetary Revenue, Expenditure,
and Balance (Adjusted): 1978-1990 (billion yuan)
Surplus or
Year Revenue Expenditure deficit
1978 112.11 111.10 1.02
1979 106.80 127.39 -20.60
1980 104.22 121.27 -17.05
1981 101.64 111.50 -9.86
1982 1.04.01 115.33 -11.32
1983 116.96 129.25 -12.29
1984 142.45 154.64 -12.19
1985 177.66 184.48 -6.82
1986 212.20 233.08 -20.88
1987 219.94 244.85 -24.91
1988 235.72 270.66 -34.93
1989 264.49 301.46 -36.97
1990 290.21 332.55 -42.34
Note: The official revenue and expenditure data have been
adjusted by excluding domestic and foreign bonds. The figures
for 1990 are planned.
Sources: ZGCZTJ pp. 11-12, 16-17, for 1978-1988;
FBIS 12 April 1990, pp. 16, 19, for 1989 and 1990.
retail prices. Even considering inflation, however, there was still
much variability in revenue growth, and between 1987 and 1989
revenue grew less than the rate of inflation.
Another way to evaluate revenue growth is to account for eco-
nomic growth using a measure called revenue buoyancy. 6 Revenue
buoyancy is calculated in Table 3 as the percentage change in reve-
nue divided by the percentage change in national income (guomin
shouru). A buoyancy value of one or more would imply that the
revenue-generating ability of the public finance system is keeping
pace with economic growth. A value less than one would imply
that the system is not capturing potential revenue sources as the
economy grows. These interpretations are subject to4,he caveat
that this measure does not distinguish between automatic increases
in revenue due to growth and increases resulting from changes in
the public finance system itself (e.g., new taxes).
Calculations of China's revenue buoyancy are given in the last
column of Table 3. With this measure China's revenue collection
also appears very unstable. China's revenue buoyancy was just
over one between 1983 and 1986, but it was low (and negative)
6 Luc De Wulf, "International Experience in Budgetary Trends during Economic Development
and Its Relevance for China," World Bank Staff Working Papers, no. 760 (Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 1986.
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Table 3. Annual Percent Change in Revenue, National Income,
and Retail Prices, and a Measure of Revenue
Buoyancy: 1978-1989
National Retail Revenue
..ear Revenue income prices buoyancy
1978 24.8 13.0 0.7 1.9
1979 -4.9 10.7 2.0 -.5
1980 -2.4 9.6 6.0 -.3
1981 -2.5 6.6 2.4 -.4
1982 2.3 7.7 1.9 0.3
1983 11.7 10.6 1.5 1.1
1984 19.7 17.7 2.8 1.1
1985 22.1 22.0 8.8 1.0
1986 17.8 11.5 6.0 1.5
1987 3.6 17.0 7.3 0.2
1988 6.9 22.9 18.5 0.3
1989 11.5 9.9 17.8 1.2
Note: The percentage changes in revenue and
national income are based on figures given in current
prices. Official revenue data have been adjusted to
exclude domestic and foreign bonds.
Sources: Revenue (adjusted data), Table 2;
national income, ZGTJNJ, 1989, p. 29, for 1978-1988, and
Aeijin Beviw 33.15 (9-15 April 1990): centerfold,
p. 1, for 1989; retail prices, ZGCZTJ, p. 180, for
1978-1988, and Beiiinq Review 33.17 (22-29 April 1990):
documents, p. E.7., for 1989.
before then, near zero in 1987 and 1988, and then back to more
than one in 1989. There was a jump from 0.3 to 1.1 in the value of
revenue buoyancy between 1982 and 1983, which coincides with the
first phase of 1i gai shui, but this increase was not sustained. So a
problem with variability, and therefore lack of predictability, in
the size of government revenue has continued despite tax reform.
CHANGES IN THE SOURCES OF REVENUE
While tax reform seems to be a minor factor in annual fluctua-
tions of government revenue, it has substantially altered the
sources of budgetary revenue. As a result of 1i gai shui, there has
been an increase in the importance of revenue collected from taxes
and a concurrent decrease in direct transfers of enterprise reve-
nues into the government treasury.
The changes in sources of budgetary revenue are summarized in
Figure 2. The percentage of enterprise revenue in total budgetary
revenue has decreased steadily from 51.0 percent in 1978 to only
1.9 percent in 1988. Concurrently, tax revenue has increased from
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46.3 percent to 74.0 percent, respectively, over the same period.
Fees generated 7.1 percent of revenue by 1988,7 and bonds generat-
ed 10.3 percent. Neither fees nor bonds were sources of revenue in
1978.
Although revenue from taxes has increased, the makeup of tax
revenue itself has not changed, as shown by Figure 3. Industrial
and commercial taxes represented 86.9 percent of total taxes in
1978 compared with 88.4 percent in 1988. The rest of tax revenue
was comprised of agricultural taxes, customs duties, and a small
category of "other taxes." Direct agricultural taxes have always
represented a small percentage of total tax revenue in China's
public finance.8 Agricultural tax revenue represented 5.5 percent
-of total tax revenue in 1978, falling to 3.1 percent in 1988. Customs
duties have also been a minor source of revenue. They represented
5.5 percent of tax revenue in 1978, increasing to 6.5 percent in
1988.
Within the category of industrial and commercial taxes, however,
major changes have occurred with the introduction of 1i gai shui.
These changes are illustrated in Figure 4. The industrial and com-
mercial tax (sometimes referred to as the consolidated industrial
and commercial tax), represented 87.5 percent of all industrial and
commercial taxes in 1978. With 1i gai shui this tax was replaced
with four new taxes: product tax, value added tax, turnover tax,
and resource tax. By 1987 the revenue from these four taxes to-
gether represented 8:3.6 percent of all industrial and commercial
taxes. The remaining 16.4 percent came from the industrial and
commercial profit tax (7.9 percent), taxes on Chinese-foreign joint
ventures and foreign firms (0.3 percent),9 and other, minor taxes
(8.2 percent).
CENTRAL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONS
In connection with tax reform, there has been much discussion
in China on the proper division of fiscal responsibility between the
central government and the provinces, and between provinces and
lower-level governments. A series of experiments in fiscal decen-
tralization have been implemented over the last decade with the
intention of finding the best mix of central-local revenue sharing
and expenditure responsibility. 10 The goal of these changes has
been to introduce incentives for local government to care about the
profitability of enterprises in their jurisdictions, and to it1lprove
revenue collection. Beginning in March 1985, the revenue collected
from each tax has been designated to go to either central or local
governments, or to be shared at a predetermined rate.
The division of revenue between the center and localities over
the decide, given in Figure 5, shows that the center's share has in-
Examples of fees are usage fees paid by enterprises on fixed and working capital
The actual contribution of agriculture to government revenues has been much higher than
direct taxes indicate. Agriculture has also contributed to government revenue through pricing
policies and collection of special fees IHsiao, The Government Budget, p.109).
1 This figure is low because even though foreign business in China has increased rapidly in
the last decade, its importance is still small compared with the size of China's economy. Also
many foreign companies receive tax "breaks" in the form of low rates or uncollected taxes, al-
though these are often countered with high prices for goods and services bought within China.
10For a description of the numerous systems tried, see [Isiao, The Government Budget, pp. 7 2-
84.
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Figure 2. Sources of
Category: 1978,
Tox revenue46.3%
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Enfe5rrqe rewetnue
1978
Budgetary Revenue by
1983, and 1988
Ta revenue
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Fees
7 4!:
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Fees7 1
TOE revenue
74%
Bonds
10 3%
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Enterpr se revenue
I 9%
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Source: ZGCZTJ. p. 17.
creased, despite the emphasis on decentralizing fiscal responsibil-
ity. The center's share in 1979 was 14.3 percent; by 1988 its share
had increased to 36.4 percent.'" Further, no major changes in the
ratio of central to local revenue appear to have coincided with 1i
gai shui in 1983 or 1984, or with the beginning of determining cen-
tral and local revenue on the basis of each tax in 1985.
1 1These figures are based on domestic revenue only. The center's share would be higher if
foreign revenue was included.
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Figure 3. Sources of Tax Revenue by Category
as a Percentage to Total Tax Revenue:
1978, 1983, and 1988
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Even so, there has been much concern in Beijing that central
revenues are inadequate, and that local governments ha ve gained
financially at the expense of "ne center. This apprehens ion over
the size of central funds originates in the distinction between, bud-
getary and extrabudgetary funds. While the center's share in bud-
getary revenues has increased, budgetary revenue itself has fallen
dramatically compared with national income. As Figure 6 illus-
trates, in 1978 budgetary revenue represented :37.2 pet-cent of na-
tional income; in 1988 it represented only 20.0 percent. In contrast,
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Figure 4. Industrial and Commercial
Taxes by Category: 1978, 1983, and 1987
Industrial and
commercial lax 87.5
Other 0.5%
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profits tax 12.
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Other & 2.
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Source- ZGCZTJ. p. 40-43
Note: Data for 1987 are used here, rather than for 1988 as n Fgjres 2
and 3, because comporable data for 1988 ore incnmpleIe
extrabudgetary revenue increased from 11.5 percent of nationalincome in 1978 to 19.3 percent in 1988. Since extrabudgetary reve-
nue is controlled primarily at local levels, these trends would ex-plain the central government's concern over its control of revenue.
Figure 6 als, suggests that a halt in the rise of extrabudgetary
revenue coincided with tax reform. An inverse relationship be-
tween budgetary and extrabudgetary revenue, as a percent of na-
tional income, existed until 1982; that is, as budgetary revenue fell,
extrabudgetary revenue rose. Beginning in 1983, their relationship
35-464 0 - 91 - 7
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Figure 5. Central-Local Revenue Sharing:
1979-1988
Percent
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Year
Local share Central share
Source: ZGCZTJ, p. 59.
Note: Based on data for domestic revenue including domestic bond revenue.
has stabilized with their proportions in national income generally
moving together (except for a jump in budgetary revenue in 1986).
More research is needed to understand how China's tax system af-
fects extrabudgetary revenue.
100%
80%
60%
40%
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V. THE "ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY" FACTOR
Complicating the tax reform picture are various forms of enter-
prise reform, or "enterprise management responsibility," begun by
the Ministry of Finance in 1987.12 With these reforms, contracts
for fixed periods of time are set up between enterprises and the
Ministry. The contracts specify quotas for payment of profit taxes
and adjustment taxes. Methods for deciding on the quotas are nu-
merous and complex, but basically the enterprise agrees to pay a
set percentage of profits based on previous performance, and then
profits earned above this are taxed at lower rates. Since profit tax
rates fall as the amount of profits increase, these contracts are sup-
posed to create incentives for enterprises to increase profits.
Under any system that taxes profits there is an incentive to
reduce the amount of profit subject to tax. In China this incentive
has been strengthened by the tax-contract system, even to the
point of reporting losses, because there is little threat of bankrupt-
cy for unprofitable enterprises. In fact, subsidies to unprofitable en-
terprises may be guaranteed to enterprises within the contract
system, although the Ministry of Finance's goal is to build into the
contract that subsidies will be phased out over time. As a result,
certain practices that reduce accounting profits are very popular,
whether an enterprise is profitable or not. For example, wages and
nonwage benefits, such as housing, have increased dramatically, as
has borrowing for investment, because both worker benefits and re-
payments on these loans are deducted before the tax liability is as-
sessed.
Another rev'ult of the contract system is that taxes on profit are
in effect negotiable. According to the tax code, the tax rate on
earnings of state firms is 55 percent for medium to large enter-
prises, and one of eight. rates between 10 and 55 percent for small
enterprises, plus the adjustment tax.' 3 In actuality, because the
profit and adjustment taxes are negotiated according to the specific
contract, the rates vary for each enterprise. Tax assessors have the
authority to consider all sorts of special circumstances when the
contracts are made.
Some of these special circumstances are beyond the control of an
enterprise. One of these is price. Because some prices are market
prices and others are fixed prices, profits may not correspond to
the success of management or productivity of workers. Also profit-
ability varies widely across industries. One reason for the new in-
dustrial and commercial taxes is to equalize profit rates so enter-
prises with low profits due to artificially high input prices or low
12 Before 1987 other forms of enterprise responsibility existed, such as the "enterprise fund"
and the "profit and loss" responsibility system. The main purpose of these earlier forms was to
give enterprises financial resources with which to reward workers. In these forms the amount of
funds an enterprise could retain was tied to variables other than profitability per se. such as the
size of their wage bill (Jingji xue wenti [Problems of Economic Study) no. #1 (1988):15; Jingji
wenti tansuo [Inquiry into Economic Problems] no. # 12 (1988):49-56).
13 The distinction between "small" enterprises and others varies depending on whether the
firm is involved in industry and transport, retail sales, or other services, and whether it is locat-
ed in Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai or elsewhere. The definitions are based on a range of
values of fixed assets, size of earnings, and number of people em loyed. The specifics can be
found in Sun Shuming and Zheng Li, "Guoying chiye lirun fenpei e falu guiding" [Legal regu-
lations of state enterprise profit distribution], Jingji went tansuo [Investigations of Economic
Problems] no.12 (1988):51.
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Figure 6. Total Budgetary and Extrabudgetary Revenue
as a Percentage of National Income: 1978-1988
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Source: ZGCZTJ, pp. 12, 103, and 173.
Note: Budgetary revenue data exclude bonds.
output prices will not be discouraged from improving efficiency.' 4
In this way economic reform can go forward without having to wait
4 For a discussion of how the product tax can be used to influence price while controlling
profitability in Chinese enterprises, see Wang Chuanlun, "Some Notes on Tax Reform in
China," China Quarterly no. #97 (March 1984):53-67.
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for full-scale price reform. Prices will still influence consumption,
but their effect on investment and production decisions can be ad-
justed.
Without price reform, however, the tax-contract system in effect
makes all taxes negotiable, and therefore ad hoc. In addition, ad-
justing taxes for each enterprise is unwieldy, and is hindered by
poor accounting, negotiation, and corruption. Therefore the overall,
long-run effect of tax and enterprise reform on government reve-
nue is difficult to predict. On the one hand provisions to allow en-
terprises to keep higher shares of incremental profits should en-
courage enterprises to increase sales and reduce costs; on the other
hand, the combined effects of negotiation, incentives to reduce ac-
counting profits, and administrative costs may overwhelm the in-
creases in revenue due to incentives to increase profits.
VI. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND REVENUE GROWTH
The 1i gai shui tax reform has been concerned with making state
enterprises efficient and dynamic by subjecting them to the same
taxation system as collectives. The achievement of these goals,
however, has been undermined by other factors that have adverse-
ly affected the performance of state enterprises. For example, infla-
tion in the late 1980s, also a result of economic reform, hurt state
enterprises more than others because they are subject to fixed state
prices and cannot pass on increased costs. This decreased profits in
state enterprises and increased the amount of revenue used for
subsidies.' 5 Also, attempts to control budgetary expenditure by cut-
ting investment curtailed growth in the state sector, and industry
in particular. Investment is a large expenditure, and is easier to
cut in major central projects than in smaller, local projects.
Failure to make state enterprises more efficient and dynamic has
affected government revenue, especially since industrial and com-
mercial taxes are such a large revenue source. This can be seen in
Table 4, which gives the share of revenue collected by ownership
category. The figures in this table show that the state sector's
share has fallen from 86.8 percent in 1978 to 74.1 percent in 1987.
Table 5, which gives the share of revenue collected by economic
sector, shows that concurrently industry's contribution to budget-
ary revenue has also fallen. Industry's share was 75.I percent in
1978, and only 56.9 percent in 1987. While industry's share was
falling, the category of "other" rose from 2.1 percent to 20.9 per-
cent during the same period, as this is where bond revenue is
counted. Contributions from the other economic sectors remained
about the same. This implies that decreases in revenue from state
industry have been largely made up by issuing bonds.
CONCLUSION
Implementation of the 1i gai shui system is the core of China's
efforts to establish a legal, uniform tax system, which gives enter-
prises autonomy from government and incentives to care about
15 Enterprise subsidies were 44.6 billion yuan in 1988, up from 24.52 billion in 1985 (the first-
year figures for these subsidies were made available). Price subsidies increased from 1.1 billion
yuan in 1978 to 31.7 billion yuan in 1988 (ZGCZTJ, pp.17, 88, 197).
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Table 4. Percentage of Revenue Collected by Ownership Category:
1978-1987
Year State Collective Individual Other
1978 86.8 12.7 0.5 0.0
1979 86.5 13.0 0.5 0.0
1980 85.4 14.0 0.6 0.0
1981 84.4 14.7 0.9 0.0
1982 81.6 15.1 3.3 0.0
1983 80.1 16.0 3.0 0.9
1984 78.9 17.2 2.8 1.1
1985 71.6 23.1 4.3 1.0
1986 77.1 16.9 4.1 1.9
1987 74.1 18.4 4.5 2.4
Source: ZGCZTJ, p. 25.
their economic performance. Budget deficits have increased since
the introduction of reforms and the share of revenue contributed
by state enterprises has fallen, but there is no evidence that tax
reform is to blame for these developments. Meanwhile the new
system has replaced enterprise remittances with tax revenue, and
shares of budgetary and extrabudgetary revenue appear to have
stabilized.
One unresolved issue is whether sufficient incentives have been
introduced to increase profits and tax revenue. The success or fail-
ure of tax reform in this regard cannot be determined yet because
the effects of the tax system cannot be separated from the results
of other economic reforms being introduced at the same time. How-
ever, the intent of establishing a uniform, nonarbitrary tax code
has been potentially undermined by the tax-contract system.
Another test of the success of tax reform will come when the
new policy instruments are used to resolve problems that arise in
the future. If tax policy is not adequate, will central leaders fall
back on directives?
So far China's leaders have not passed this critical point. Eco-
nomic austerity measures in the fall of 1988, and panic directives
after economic disruption caused by the student demonstrations in
June 1989, are cases in point. Nonetheless, economic reform is still
on the agenda, and a new tax system is in place. That Chinese
leaders have concerned themselves with these important aspects of
the economy is reason for optimism.
Table 5. Percentage of Revenue Collected by Economic Sector: 1978-1987
Year Industry Agriculture Commerce Transport Construction Other
1978 75.4 2.8 12.2 7.3 0.2 2.11979 78.8 2.9 4.7 7.7 0.0 5.9
1980 82.7 3.0 1.5 6.5 0.1 6.21981 81.9 3.5 0.3 5.8 -0.1 8.61982 84.0 4.4 -3.7 4.6 0.1 10.6
1983 86.0 5.4 -7.9 5.7 0.9 9.91984 77.8 4.1 -0.8 8.3 0.4 10.2
1985 64.0 4.7 7.7 7.0 0.4 16.2
1986 56.1 3.6 14.7 5.4 1.0 19.2
1987 56.9 5.1 11.5 5.2 0.4 20.9
Source: ZGCZTJ, p. 33.
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